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THE POWER TO APPOINT TO OFFICE; ITS LOCATION

AND LIMITS 1

AT

no other time in the judicial history of this country, if the
evidence of the reported cases is to be relied upon, have
there been so many and so bitter contests over all of the questions
growing out of the title to public offices, as during the last ten or
twelve years. This is undoubtedly largely accounted for by the
fact that within that period a large number of the states have put in
operation radically changed methods of conducting elections, based
upon or practically incorporating what is popularly known as the
Australian ballot system. In making these changes, the several
states have retained enough of general similarity to attest the likeness of their respective methods to the original type, but at the
same time they have introduced so much of local variation and
addition as to give rise to a great number of new and perplexing'
questions of interpretation and application.
During this same period, also, an apparently increasing anxiety
to Secure the emoluments of office has given birth to numerous contests over the title to official salaries and fees; and it is doubtless
true that this seemingly sharpened appetite for the spoils of office
has lain at the foundation of much other litigation in which the
right to salary or fees was only incidentally involved.
Among the many questions relating to public office which in this
period have thus attracted the attention of our courts, is the one to
which attention will be given in this paper,-the question, Where
does the power to appoint to public office reside, and what are the
limitations which attend its exercise? It may seem, on its first
statement, that there ought to be but little room for doubt upon this
question, but the fact that it has proven to be one of great inherent
difficulty, as well as the paramount importance of the question in
2 The substance of this article was originally delivered as an address before the Michigan State Bar Association. In some places its original form as a spoken address has been
retained.
2
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itself, are the excuses for its discussion at the present time.
Lying immediately back of this question, and closely allied to it,
is the question which I shall content myself with suggesting but
not discussing ;-Whether under the system of republican government -to which we are pledged, and which the United States is
bound to guarantee to every State, there exist any limitations upon
the power of the people to exercise the power of appointing their
officers generally, rather than electing them. Whether, in other
words, it is competent for the people to provide for one or two
great elective officers who shall themselves appoint the residue of
the vast number of officers required, instead of leaving them all to
be elected at popular elections.
Passing this question by as one of no present consequence, at
least, I shall assume that we will all agree that the power to deter"mine what officers shall be chosen to exercise the functions of government, and by what method they shall be chosen-whether by
popular election or by appointment by other officers,-is vested in
the people themselves; and that in framing their systems of government and forming their constitutions, they may make such provisions and adopt such methods, as to them may seem expedient and
proper. For present purposes, therefore, I shall assume that the
people, in their constitutions, may determine what officers shall be
appointed, and how, and by whom; and that wherever express
provisions of this sort are found, they will be deemed conclusive.'
Strange as it may perhaps seem, however, many of our state constitutions, the constitution of Michigan included, contain exceedingly meagre provisions upon this subject, and the question is
therefore open for discussion: What provisions are to be implied?
For the purpose of clearing the ground for the main subject, it
may be well at the outset to consider briefly some incidental and
collateral phases which the courts have had occasion to deal with.
I.
And, first, it is doubtless true that the power to make some
appointments may be deemed to be an incident of certain larger
powers expressly conferred, "as, for instance," to use the language
of Judge Coffey, of the supreme court of Indiana, 2 "the appoint1 Thus where the constitution expressly provides that officers shall either be elected or
appointed by the governor, a statute attempting to confer appointing power upon the
supreme court is void: State v. Rocker. 39 Fla. 477,22 So. Rep. 721, 63 Am. St. Rep. 174.

2 State v. Denny, 118 Ind.at p. 389. See also State v. Barker (1902), - Iowa -, 89 N. W.
Rep. 204.
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ments made by judicial officers in the discharge of their official
duties or the appointments made by the general assembly of officers
necessary to enable it to properly discharge its duties as an independent legislative body, and the like." "Such appointments,"
continues the same judge, "by the several departments of the state
government are necessary to enable them to maintain their independent existence, and do not involve an encroachment upon the
functions of any other branch."
II.
In the second place it may be noticed that, in Michigan, at least,
1
and People v. Detroit,2 the
since the decision in People v. Hurlbr,
right of local self-government forbids such a construction of the
general appointing power conferred upon any state officer as would
permit the permanent appointment by him of purely local officers.
Whether a temporary and provisional appointment might be made
to operate until the office could be filled by the proper local authorities, was a question much discussed in People v. Hurlbut, andupon
which, as there presented, the court was equally divided. Thatsuch
an appointment may be made, however, was asserted in the more
recent case of Moreland v. Millen, 3 though it was found that .no
such exigency appeared as to justify its exercise. The reasoning
sustaining the power was also approved in Luehrman v. Taxing
District,4 and in State v. IrWin,5 and State v. Swift,8 the power
to make such provisional appointments was affirmed, though this
decision was coupled with views respecting the right of local selfgovernment, which cannot be reconciled with those prevailing in
Michigan,
III.
In the third place our attention may be called to that phase of the
subject presented by thequestion, much discussed of late, whether
the power expressly conferred upon the legislature by the constitution in some states to prescribe the manner of appointing is sufficient to authorize the legislature to make the appointment itself.
In State v. Kennem, 7 which arose in 1857, the question was vig1 24 Mich, 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103.
2 25 Mich. 228,
3 126 Mich.381, 85 N. W. Rep. 882.

4 70 Tenn. 425. 441.
6 5 Nev.111.
6 11 Nev. 128.
7 7 Ohio St. 546.
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orously discussed.
The constitution of Ohio, after providing for
certain officers, proceeded to declare that"The election and appointment of all officers
not otherwise provided for by this constitution
shall be made in such
manner as shall be directed by law; but no appointing power shall be exercised by the general assembly except as prescribed in this constitution, and in
the election of United States senators."

The constitution also provided that"The directors of the penitentiary shall be appointed or elected in such
manner as the general assembly may direct."

Under this constitution the legislature passed an act appointing

Kennon and two others as a board to supervise the construction of
the new state house; and also an act by which this board was
authorized and directed to appoint directors of the state penitentiary.
In an action of quo warranto against Kennon and his
associates, it was contended that the power conferred upon the
legislature to direct the manner in which officers should be elected
or appointed, was equivalent to authority to make the appointment
itself. Speaking of this contention, the court, by Brinkerhoff, J.,
said:"To make good this claim it must be made to appear that the power to
direct the 'manner' the mode, the way, in which an act shall be done, and
the power and authority to do the act itself, are one and the same thing. But
that they are not identical or equivalent to each other, is too clear for argument, and almost too clear to admit of illustration. To prescribe the manner
of election or appointment to an office is an ordinary legislative function. To
make an appointment to office is an admiifistrative function.
And under a
constitution in which the philosophical theory of a division of the powers of
government into legislative, executive and judicial, should be exactly carried
out in detail, the power of prescribing the manner of making appointments to
office would fall naturally and properly to the legislative department; while
the power to make the appointments themselves would fall as naturally and
properly to the executive department. This exact adherence to theory, however, is seldom, if ever, found in any frame of government; and we refer to
the distinction simply by way of reply to the claim on behalf of defendants, in
argument, that the power to prescribe the manner of appointments includes
the power of appointment itself, and to show that they are acts and powers
wholly different and distinct from each other.
"How far the general assembly may go, and just what it may or may not
do, in the exercise of the power here conferred, to direct the manner of the
election or appointment of directors of the penitentiary, are questions not
before us. We have not considered them, nor do we intend to attempt to
answer them. It will be time enough to do so, when they are presented in a case
actually pendingbefore us. But conceding, forthe sake of the argument, that
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it would be competent for the legislature to constitute a board of commissioners to hold office during life even, for the appointment of directors of the
penitentiary, it is clear that the legislature cannot, under the constitution,
itself appoint and designate the members of such board. They must be either
elected by the people of the state, or appointed by some constitutional agency
other than the general assembly."

Swan, J., in the same case, used the following language:"Upon this question, it seems to me only necessary to refer to the plain
-words of the constitution.
It provides in the first place, that 'the election
and appointment of all officers, and the filling of all vacancies, not otherwise
provided for by this constitution or the constitution of the United States,
shall be made in such manner as may be directed by law.'
Now, providing
by law the manner in which an appointment shall be made, and the making
of the appointment itself, are two different things; the first is pointing out
the mode in which the thing shall be done, and the other is doing the thing
itself; the one is legislative and directory, the other administrative."

The same question subsequently arose in Indiana, in 1888, in the

case of State, ex rtel. Jameson v. Denny.'
provided (§ 1, Art. 15), that-

The constitution there

"All officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in this
constitution, shall be chosen in such manner as now is, or hereafter may be,
prescribed by law."

The court after quoting with approval the language in State v.
Kennon, proceeded to say:"We think it plain that the power to provide by law the manner or mode
of making an appointment, does not include the power to make the appointment itself. As has been said, by! l, Article XV., the general assembly has the
right to appoint such officers as it had the right by the law in force at the
time of its adoption to select, and by the terms of that section it also has the
right to prescribe by law the manner in which officers for whose appointment no
provision is made in the constitution, shall be appointed. What, then, is the
limit of the legislative power to appoint to offices created by statute, or is
there any limit to such power? If there is no limit, then the general assembly may appoint all the officers created by statute, from the attorney general
of the state down to the smallest township officer, for they are all the creatures of the statute.
It may appoint the board of county commissioners, the
township trustees, county superintendents, and even road supervisors. It may
create offices without limit, and fill them with its own appointees.
"In the light of the contemporaneous historyof theconstitution, wedonot
think it will be seriously contended that the framers of that instrument
intended to confer upon, or leave with, the general assembly any such power.
Where, then, is the limit? Whatever the limit may be, it is clear to us that
it has no power to fill, by appointment, a local office like the one now under
consideration. As the right to prescribe by law the manner of appointing to
1 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. I. Rep. 252, 4 T. 1. A. 79.
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a new office created by the legislature does not carry with it the right to make
such appointment, we know of no provision in the constitution under which
such right can reasonably be asserted.
It is believed that this conclusion
accords with the practical construction heretofore placed upon our constitution."

So again in State v. Peelle,'thecourt reiterated the same doctrine,
saying"That giving the legislature power to prescribe by law the manner of
electing officers does not confer the power to elect, and that there is a manifest distinction between providing the mode of doing a thing and doing the
thing itself."

Later cases in Indiana have recognized the same distinction; and

a recent case in Missouri 2 strongly re-enforces it.
On the other hand, in a leading case in Maryland:-AMayor of
Baltimore v. Stae,3 it appeared that the constitution of that state
conferred upon the governor the appointment of all officers not
otherwise provided for "unless a different mode of appointment be
prescribed by the law creating the office." The legislature, having
passed an act providing for a board of officers, and having named
the officers in the body of the act, it was contended that the section
of the constitution above referred to gave to the legislature, in creating an office, power only to prescribe the mode of appointment and
could, by no legitimate rule of construction, be interpreted to grant
the power to the legislature to make the appointment itself. But
the court declinedto adopt this construction, saying:"It is conceded that the legislature was not under any obligation to confer the power of appointment on the executive; by this clause of the constitu-

tion the power was placed there, in the event of a different mode not being
prescribed in the law. But, it is said, it ought to have been delegated to the
people or local authorities of the city of Baltimore. In the absence of any
such requirement of the legislature, we do not perceive that they were under
a duty to make such delegation of the appointing power. The constitution
surely designed to repose some discretion in the legislature, both over the
mode of appointment and the propriety and necessity of passing any law on
the subject to which the exercise of the power might relate. It seems difficult
to suppose that the people, through the constitution, would intrust to that
branch of government nearest to the source of power the right to create an
office, and to indicate others to appoint the officers, and be unwilling to place
the appointment with the legislature itself."

Substantially the same question was involved in Michigan in the
1 121 Ind.495.
2 State v. Wasbburn (1902), - Mo.- , 67 S.W. Rep. 592.
3 15 Md. 376. 74 Am. Dec. 572.
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case of People v. Hrlbut,1 though its scope was somewhat more
limited. Section 14 of Art. XV, of the constitution of Michigan
(Art. XV being the article entitled Corporations) provides that"All judicial officers of cities and villages shall be elected, and all other
officers shall be elected or appointed at such time and in such manner as the
legislature may direct."

All of the judges assumed, and Campbell, Ch. J., expressly
declared, what seems sufficiently obvious from its location, that this
provision applies only to municipal officers, and does not operate
upon offices generally.

The exigencies of the case did not require
a decision upon the question, but part of the judges referred to it,
and Christiancy, J., said:"The next objection to the validity of the act is, that the power of the
legislature (under 14, Art. XV), is confined to directing whether officers
other than judicial, in cities and villages, shall be elected or appointed, and
at what time and in what manner the election or appointment shall be made;
that in thus directing, their power is exhausted, and they cannot make the
appointment themselves.
"This argument is not based upon the ground that the provisions of this
section were intended to confine the power of making the appointment to the
common council of the city or to any other local authority for which only it
was intended the legislature should provide; but it goes upon the assumption that, even admitting the power of the legislature to provide for an appointment otherwise than by the local authorities of the city, still the legislature
could not itself make the appointment in the manner they have undertaken
by this act to make it; their power being limited to directing the time and
manner in which it should be made.
"Though this argument may seem plausible, I do not think the conclusion
is so clear or free from doubt as to authorize us to declare the act void on this
ground. If the legislature had the power to provide the time and manner of
the appointment, and were not confined to providing for the appointment by
the local authorities, then they had the power to provide that it should be
made by the governor with or without the consent of the senate, or by the
legislature in joint convention, or finally, by the legislature in the very form
and manner which was adopted. And if they had the power to direct that it
should be made in this way, it would be very difficult to give any substantial
reason why they could not proceed to make the appointment as they did,
without first passing an act providing that it should be so made. Such an
act would be but a legislative determination that the appointment should be
so made; and the actual making of it in this way shows the like legislative
determination. A similar exerciseof power by the legislature hasbeen upheld
by the supreme court of New York."'2
Many other cases upon this subject might be referred to, but these
1 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103.
2 People v. Bennett, 54 Barb. 480.
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are suffcient to show the wide divergence of judicial opinion, and
space will not permit, nor does the subject justify, a fuller treatment of it.
IV
Passing now, lastly to the main point to be considered, the question is this: When the constitution contains no provision regulating the. matter of appointments, where is the power of appointment
located? Does it belong exclusively to the executive, or to the
legislative or to the judicial department? May it properly be conferred upon either branch?
No serious claim has ever been made, so far as I am aware, that
the power of appointment generally is a judicial function, though,
as will be noticed later on, the right to confer some appointing
power upon the judiciary has been expressly recognized. In
Michigan, however, it is expressly denied to the judiciary by the
language of the constitution. 1 Is it then an exclusively executive function, or may the legislature exercise it? Around this
question the battle has been waged.
The constitution of Michigan, like that of most of the states, provides (Art. III), that"The powers of government are divided into three departments: The
legislative, executive, and judicial."

And further that"No person belonging to one department shall exercise the powers properly
belonging to another, except in the cases expressly provided in this constitution."

The constitution of Michigan nowhere expressly locates the
general appointing power, except for the filling of vacancies, in
which cases the governor must act. As a matter of fact, the
statutes providing for offices in this state have very generally vested
the power of appointment in the governor. But is it necessarily an
executive function? If it is, then under the constitutional provisions
last referred to, the legislature could not make appointments itself;
if it is not, the legislature may have the power.
I repeat then, Is appointment to office intrinsically, inherently and

necessarily an executive function?
Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Samuel Kercheval, dated July
16, 1816, said:"Nomination to office is an executive function. To give it to the legislature, as we do in Virginia, is a violation of the principle of the separation of
I

10,ArLtV.
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powers. It swerves the members from correctness by temptation to intrigue
forofficefor themselves, and to a corruptbarter for votes, and destroys responsibility by dividing it among a multitude."

In Taylor v. Commonwealth,' a writ of error had been sued out to
review the act of a county court in appointing a clerk of the court.
A question was made whether the act was, in its nature, such an
9ne as could be reviewed under this writ. The court held that it
was not, and Robertson, Ch. J., said:"The appointment of a clerk is not, strictly speaking, a judicial act.
Appointments to office are intrinsically executive. And although the constitution has confided to the courts the appointment of their own clerks, still
the nature of the power is not changed. It is essentially executive, whensoever, or by whomsoever it may be exercised. It is as much executive when
exercised by a court as by the governor. It is the prerogative of appointing
to office, and is of the same nature, whether it belongs to a court or to a governor. The appellate jurisdiction of this court is judicial. We can revise
that only which is judicial."

In Achley's Case,2 it appeared that the law gave to the common
council of cities the power to appoint commissioners of deeds, and
Achley had been so appointed by the common council of the city of
New York. The mayor of the city undertook to veto this appointment under his authority to interpose his veto against legislative
acts; but the court held that this was not such a case, saying:-"The exercise of the power of appointment to office is a purely executive
act; and when the authority conferred has been exercised, it is final, for the
term of the appointee."

In State, ex rel. Coogan v. Barbour,3 it appeared that the common
council of the city was authorized to elect a city attorney. A meeting was duly held, a vote was taken and the relator Coogan, having
received a majority of the votes, was declared elected. A motion
was soon afterwards made to treat the first ballot as void and to
declare defendant Barbour elected. This motion was adopted, and
the question was which of these two persons was elected. The
court held that Coogan was elected, on the ground that the election
or appointment was an executive act, and when once performed was
final. 4 "Appointments to office," said the court, "by whomsoever
made are intrinsically executive acts."
Similar declarations are
also to be found in many other cases. 5
13

3..
Marshall (Ky.) 401.

2 14 Abbott's Prac. Rep. 35.

3 53 Conn. 76, 55 Am. Rep. 65.
4 Upon this point, compare Attorney General v. Oakman. 126 Mich. 717.
GThus in Murphy v. Webster, 131 Mass. 482: Gray. Ch. 3. says: "The power to appoint
and the power to remove officers are in their nature executive powers."
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No one of these cases however, fairly presented the question now
in issue, but in 1888, there began a somewhat remarkable series of
cases before the supreme court of Indiana, in which nearly all possible aspects of it received consideration.
In the first of these cases, State, ex rel. Jameson v. Denny,' it
appeared that the legislature had passed an act providing for the
appointment of a board of public works in every city of fifty thousand inhabitants or more, and declaring that such board should be
elected bythe legislature in joint convention. Pursuant to the terms
of this act, the general assembly had elected a board of public works
for the city of Indianapolis, but the mayor of the city had refused
to recognize them, and this action was brought to compel him to do
so. Three of the judges wrote opinions, but the question raised
may be shown by an extract from the leading opinion of Judge
Coffey:"Admitting for the time being that the act in question is otherwise valid,
it in insisted that under our constitution the general assembly had no power
to elect or appoint the appellants, and that so much of the act as attempts to
confer on it such power is in conflict -with the constitution and is therefore
void. It is claimed that the appointment to an office is an executive function,
and that by the terms of our constitution the general assembly is prohibited
from filling an office created by it, unless such office is connected with the
duties imposed upon it as a legislative body. This contention arises out of
the provision of 1 Art. I., of the constitution which is as follows: 'The
powers of the government are divided into three separate departments; the
legislative; the executive, including the administrative; and the judicial; and
no person charged with official duties under one of these departments shall
exercise any of the functions of another except as in this constitution
expressly provided.' "
The learned judge then proceeded to define each power, saying:"Legislative power is the power to make, alter and repeal laws and is
vested in the general assembly; the judicial power is the power to construe
and interpret the constitution and the laws and make decrees determining
controversies, and is vested in the courts. The executive power is the power
to execute the laws, and is vested in the'governor of the state, the administrative officers of the state, counties, townships, towns and cities. Then to
which one of these departments does the appointment to office belong?"
Generally, proceeded the same judge, the appointment to an office

is an executive function. It is conceded that the legislature and the
judiciary have certain incidental power of appointment, but"The appointment to an office like the one involved here, where it is in no
manner connected with the discharge of legislative duties, we think involves
the exercise of executive functions and falls within the prohibition of J1 Art.

2 118 Imd. 382. 21 N.

E. Rep. 252, 4 L. R. A. 79.
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III of the constitution."
.
"In our opinion, so much
of the act now under consideration as attempts to confer on the general assembly the duty of appointing or electing to the office now claimed by the appel.
lants, is in conflict with our constitution, and is void. It seeks to confer on
that body executive functions which it is prohibited from exercising."

Elliott, Ch. J., wrote a separate opinion in which among other
things, he said:,

"The legislature does not, in my opinion, either by express
grant or by
implication, possess any general and unrestricted appointing power. It is
generally agreed that the power of appointment is intrinsically an executive
power; it is, at all events, not properly a law-making power. It is one thing
to make a place for a man by enacting a law, and another thing to put him in
that place. The one thing is purely and intrinsically legislative, the other is
not."
The court held the act in question invalid, but its violation of

the right of local self-government was also urged against it, and
this contention was sustained by a majority of the court. Mitchell,
J., dissented, denying the right of local self-government in this
case, and asserting the power of the legislature to make the election
as it had done.

In the second case, Evansville v. State,' it appeared that the
same legislature had provided for a police and fire board in cities
having a population of 29,000 or more. The members of the first
board were to be elected by the legislature. Under this act, the
legislature elected a board for the city of Evansville, but they were
refused recognition by the local authorities and this action was

brought to compel such recognition. The court held this act also
unconstitutional for the reason that it violated the right of local
self-government and because the legislature had no power to
elect the officers. Upon this latter point, Berkshire, J., who wrote
the opinion of the court, said:"The power to appoint to office is not a legislative function but belongs to
the executive department of the government."
"Prescribing the mode of
appointment is one thing, making the appointment is another.
One is the
exercise of the legislative power, the other the exercise of an executive function. As the legislature is limited to the exercise of legislative power, except
when otherwise expressly provided, its power ceases when it prescribes the
mode of appointment to office, except in cases where express power is given
to make appointments."
"The legislature may provide by law for the
appointment of all officers not provided for in the constitution, but the
appointing power must be lodged somewhere within the executive department
of the government."

Mitchell, J., dissented.
1 118 Id. 426. 21 N. n. Rep. 267, 4 L. R. A. 93.
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1
In the third case, State, ex rel. Holt v. Denny, an act
similar to the one last considered was involved. This act
also was held to be unconstitutional. The chief stress of the
opinion was laid upon the right of the municipality to regulate its
own affairs, but upon the point now under consideration, the court,
by Olds, J., said:-

"Under our system- of government, divided into three separate, distinct,
co-ordinate branches, the legislative and judicial departments may exercise
appointing power to offices peculiarly related to and connected with the
exercise of their constitutional functions, and to maintain their independent
existence; that is to say, the general assembly may elect or appoint the
officers of their respective branches and relating to their department of the

government; courts may appoint administrators, guardians, master commis-

sioners, and such officers as are necessary to the free and independent exercise of power conferred by the constitution, but the appointment of officers
generally is naturally and properly an executive function."

Mitchell, J. dissented as before.
2
In Hovey v. State, ex rel. Carson, decided in 1889, the question arose as to the power of the legislature to elect trustees for
the state asylum for the insane. Jiudge Mitchell, who had dissented
in the three preceding cases wrote the leading opinion, though three
other judges also wrote opinions and none of them entirely concurred
with Judge Mitchell. Judge Mitchell's position was that the general
power to appoint officers is not inherent in the executive or any other
branch of the government, but that it is a prerogative of the people
to be exercised by them directly or by any department of government to which it had been either expressly or impliedly confided by the constitution. Judge Berkshire contended, as in the
previous cases, that the power to appoint to office is an executive
function and is lodged with the executive department of the government except where the constitution expressly provides otherwise. All of the judges however, concurred in holding the election
valid on the ground that the trustees of the insane asylum had been
habitually chosen by the legislature up to the time of the adoption
of the present constitution, and that this method was therefore by
practical construction brought within the constitutional provision
that, "All officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for in this constitution shall be chosen in such manner as now is,
or hereafter may be, provided for by law."
1 118 Ind. 449, 21 N. ]. Rep. 274,4 L. R. A. 65.

2 119 Ind. 395.
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At the same term, the case of Hovey v. State, ex rel. Riley,'
was decided. This case involved the right of the legislature to
elect trustees of the state institution for the education of the blind.
This election was sustained. Elliott, Ch. J., who wrote the leading
opinion of the court, said:"That there is a class of officers that may be appointed by the general
assembly cannot now be justly denied and the only question which is still open
to debate is, What officers belong to this class? It is our judgment that in
view of the provisions of the constitution and the effect given them by practical exposition, the governing officers of all of the benevolent institutions of
the state may rightfully be appointed by the general assembly."
It appeared in this case that the right to elect officers of this class
had been exercised without question by the legislature ever since
the adoption of the present constitution. Treating this practice as
a practical exposition of the constitution, the majority of the court
sustained the election. Berkshire and Coffey, JJ. dissented.
Later in the same year State, ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde,2 was
decided.
The legislature at its last session had created the office of "director of the department of geology and natural resources of the state
of Indiana," and provided that such director should be, and he
was, elected by the legislature. The director was authorized to
appoint certain subordinate officers. The governor of the state,
disregarding the election by the legislature, treated the office as
vacant, and proceeded to fill it by appointment. The governor's
appointee named a subordinate officer to fill a position to which
another person had been already appointed by the director elected
by the legislature, and the action was to try their respective titles.
The governor's appointment was held to be valid. Berkshire, J.
wrote the leading opinion of the court, insisting, as he had held
before, that the power to appoint is an executive and not a legislative function. He said:"The said office being a state office, the legislature could not delegate the.
power to some other state officer to appoint and commission the relator,
though that officer may have been duly appointed and commissioned. In so
far as the act of the legislature seeks to deprive the executive of the state of
his constitutional prerogative to fill by appointment vacancies in the offices.
named in said act, it is unconstitutional and void."
Mitchell, J. and Elliott, Ch. J., dissented.
119 Ind. 386.
2 121 Ind. 20.
1

The latter said:-
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"I am fully persuaded that the legislature ought not to have the general
power to create and to fill offices of its own creation, and that if the opinions
of the great thinkers of our country had been given full force it would have
no such power; but, while I am persuaded that it should not have this power,
my judgment is thoroughly convinced that it does have power to create and
to fill a class of offices, and that the office in controversy belongs to that
class. I regret the conclusion, but I cannot escape it. I have searched with
all possible care, but I can find no decision which sustains the contention of
the relator, that the appointing power resides in the governor. I find no
conflict but entire unanimity, for in every case that I have seen, it is affirmed
that, unless expressly prohibited by constitutional provisions, there is a class
of offices which the legislature may create, and fill by appointment."
After considering a number of cases to be hereafter dealt with,
Judge Elliott said:"The conclusion deducible from these authorities is, so far as it is here
necessary to ascertain it, that where the legislature has power to establish a
scientific department or to establish any public institution, it has, as an
incident of that power, the right to select the means and agencies it deems
necessary to carry into effect the law it has enacted."
Still later in the same year, in State v. Peelle,' the court had
before it the office of chief of the bureau of statistics.
When this
office was created the act provided that the governor should appoint,
but by an amendment made some time later it was provided that
the officer should be elected by the legislature. The legislature
elected a person to fill the office, but the governor, deeming this
election unauthorized and the office therefore vacant, made an
appointment to fill the vacancy. The office in this case differed
from most of those dealt with in the preceding cases, in being a
general state office, unconnected with any particular municipality,
and not concerning any of the state institutions over which the legislature, according to the previous cases, had, by practical construction and long acquiescence, acquired the appointing power. In
dealing with this phase of it, the court said: "In view of the object of the law and the nature of the office, it is unquestionably a state office and we find upon examination of the laws of other states
that offices of this character are not regarded by the legislatures of other states
as in any sense legislative offices, coming within the prerogative of the legislature to elect the officers. Having reached this conclusion, the next question
-for determination is the right of the legislature under the constitution to create
a state office and fill it by the general assembly electing the officer. This
bring us tothe consideration of the power of the general assembly. This
must be determined by some general principles."

The court then proceeded to a discussion of the language of the
1 121 Ind. 495.
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constitution, and particularly of § 1 of Art. XV so often referred to
in the preceding cases and said, that"Under the new constitution which took effect November 21,1851, the power
to elect state officers whose duties are general and such as the duties of the chief
of the Indiana bureau of statistics, remains with the people, and that the proper
interpretation and construction to be given to 1, Art. XV is that state officers
shall be chosen by the electors of the state in such manner as may be prescribed
by law, and that it is the duty of the legislature in creating a state office to
fix the term of the office and provide for the election of the officer by the
people."
"The conclusion we reach is that the general assembly had no
power to elect the appellee to the office in question, .and that such election
was void; that the information alleges there was a vacancy in the office; that
the appellee usurped the office, and illegally held possession of it; that the
governor appointed the relator, and he was eligible and is entitled to the
office."

Elliott, Ch. J., and Mitchell J., dissented.
Substantially the same questions arose in State v. Gorby,l and
the same conclusion was there reached. One extract only from
the opinion will be given:"It is urged," said the court, "thatin the absence of some express statutory orconstitutional provision, the governor of the state cannot fill an office
by appointment. We have no doubt that the general assembly may, in certain
cases, create an office, and provide by law that it shall remain vacant until
some future time; but such is not the case before us. When an office is created, to be filled immediately, the presumption must b!. indulged that the
authority creating such office was satisfied that there was a public necessity
for the office. If no legitimate mode is provided for filling the same, it is
vacant the moment the law takes effect by which it is created. The constitution provides that the governor shall see to it that the laws are faithfully
executed. The law abhors a vacancy in a necessary office; and under this
constitutional provision, we think the governor not only has the right to fill
all vacancies in state offices, where no other legal mode is prescribed, but that
it is his duty to do so, to the end that the law prescribing the duties of the
incumbent of the office maybe faithfully executed. If itwere not so thepublic would suffer, and the governor would be without the power of performing
this constitutional obligation."
The constitution however seems to expressly confer upon the
governor the power to fill vacancies and what was here said may
have been said in view of this constitutional provision.
In 1891 the legislature of Indiana passed an act abolishing the
office involved in the case of State v. Hyde, 2 above referred to,
created a new office to be known as the office of state supervisor of
oil inspection with duties substantially similar to those of the old
1 122 Ind. 17.

2 121 Ind. 20.
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office, and provided that the incumbent should from time to time be
appointed by the state geologist. The latter made an appointment,
but the governor, claiming that the power of appointment belonged
to him, also made an appointment. The governor's appointee sought
to oust the appointee of the state geologist. 1 It was conceded that
the legislature could not appoint, and it was contended by the relator
that the power of appointment was so intrinsically an executive
function that it could not be vested elsewhere than in the governor.
This was a new aspect of the question, but the court unanimously
sustained the appointment made by the state geologist, saying:'The solution of the question presented for decision depends upon the
nature of the office and the construction to be placed upon this provision of
our state constitution. The office is not an administrative state office, whose
incumbent is charged with the administration of a separate department of the
state government. The duties to be performed are such as pertain purely to
the police. It is an office, therefore, which maybe filled by appointment, and
as the appointment of the incumbent is not provided for in the constitution,
the case falls clearly within the provision of 1, Art. XV. That section applies
to such officers only as may be appointed, and for whose appointment no provision is made by the constitution. Asthe incumbent of the office in question
may be appointed, and as no provision* is made in the constitution for his
appointment, the general assembly has the power to provide by law for the
manner of his selection. It has the power to provide that such office shall be
filled by popular election, or that it shall be filled by appointment. While
the appointment to office is, generally, the exercise of an executive or administrative function, we do not think it must, of necessity, be made by the chief
executive, for by the terms of 1, Art. III of the constitution, the executive
department of the state includes the administrative. Of course it was not the
intention that any administrative state officer should perform any duty properly
and necessarily belonging to the governor of the state, but it was, we think,
the intention that such officers should have the power to perform such duties
as should be required of them by law, in the administration of the state government where such requirement in no wise conflicted with the powers delegated to the governor alone. The appointment to office being generally the
exercise of an executive or administrative function, the power must be conferred upon some executive or administrative officer, but the state geologist is
an administrative state officer, elected by the people. The appointment to the
office in controversy here by the state geologist is certainly a manner or mode
of selecting an officer for whose appointment no provision is made by our constitution. Nor does such mode of selection in any manner infringe upon the
prerogatives of the governor of the state."

In 1895, the legislature passed an act providing that the governor,
auditor, treasurer, secretary of state and attorney general should
constitute a board for the selection of prison directors. A majority
I State v. Hyde, 129 Ind. 296, 28 N. 9. Rep. 186, 13 L.

I.

A. 79.
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of this board made an appointment, but the governor, claiming that
he had the sole power to appoint, made a different appointment,
and the question arose as to the validity of his act.1
The position of the governor was that all of the appointing power
was necessarily vested in him, and that it could not be conferred
upon the board in question, nor could he be required to permit any
of the administrative officers of the state to join with him in making
the appointment.
The court unanimously rejected his contention,
and sustained the appointment by the board. The reasoning of the
court in brief was that, under the practical construction of the constitution, the appointment of prison directors was not entrusted to
the governor alone; that the appointment might have been made by
the legislature directly, or the legislature might determine the manner of appointment; and that in prescribing the manner, there was
no objection to providing for an appointment by a board as well as
by the governor alone.
The court said:"The contention that the association with the governor of administrative
state officers, in the duty charged by the law in review, infringes his prerogative as the executive head of the state, restsupon the proposition that the
power of appointment, in this instance, is an executive function. We should
not incline to the view that, if an executive function, the duties and responsibilities attending the exercise of that function could be shared by administrative officers. But, as we have shown, that is not the case before us. Nor
do we find it necessary to our conclusion that, while by constitutional permit
the appointment may be made directly by the general assembly, it must be
done so, for, by the plain language of the constitution, the manner is a matter of choice by the general assembly. This choice is not embarrassed by
limitations or conditions, and to render it invalid it must be so exercised as
to confer it upon some one or number incapable of its performance.
"There is no expressed inhibition of our constitution to the discharge of
this duty by executive or administrative officers, or by both classes of
officers. It is the constitutional theory of our form of government ....
that the relation of the executive and the administrative subdivisions are not
to be so separated as to deny to the former all participancy in the affairs of
the latter.
Not only is there no express inhibition against the association of
the governor with administrative state officers, in the discharge of any duty
not involving powers and privileges delegated by the constitution to either
alone, or to some other department of the government, but in our opinion,
such association is proper and within the spirit of the provisions of the constitution just referred to."

In 1897 arose the question of the right to confer upon judicial
officers the power to appoint officers not wholly judicial in their
I French v. The State, ex rel. Harley, 141 Ind. 618. 41 N.

.Rep. 2, 29 I, R. A. 113.
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character. Legislation providing for the opening and laying out of
streets confided the question of the assessment of damages and benefits to five persons called "city commissioners," appointed by the
judge of the circuit court of the county. This legislation was
attacked on the ground that it violated the constitutional provision
respecting the distribution of powers.'
The legislation, however,
was sustained on two grounds:"It is not a function of the executive or legislative department of the state
government to appoint city commissioners, and when a circuit judge appoints
city commissioners, he is not exercising any function of either of said departments. Neither are the city commissioners, when appointed, a part of either
the executive or legislative department of the state government, nor do they
exercise any of the functions of either of said departments. While the city
commissioners do not constitute a court, yet, their duties are quasi judicial,
and their powers have been likened to the powers and duties of an ad guod
damnum jury, Elkhart v. Simonton, 71 Ind. 7, 21. Their powers and duties
are more of a judicial than an executive or administrative character. The
appointment of city commissioners is not a judicial act. A judicial officermay,
by authority of law, perform other than judicial acts; but when performed
they do not become judicial because they were performed by a judicial
officer."
"Moreover, said acts of the legislature certainly present a case of practical
construction of the constitution upon the question raised.
Itor over forty
years this practice adopted by the legislature has been continued and acquiesced in by all the departments of the state, and a disregard thereof by the
court, at this time, might destroy titles, impair the obligations of contracts,
and do much mischief. Under the doctrine of practical construction, it would
seem that the questions presented concerning the appointment of city comnmissioners by a judge shouldbe regarded as settled."

And finally, in 1900, the court was called upon to decide whether
the power to appoint certain officers might be confided to one who
was not an officer at all in any department, or, specifically, whether
the power to appoint members of the state board of examiners in
dentistry could be conferred upon the state dental association, a
private corporation existing under the laws of the state.
This
question was answered in the affirmative. 2 Two reasons were relied
upon:"While it has been many times decided by this and other courts that, a# a
general rule, the power of appointment to office is an appropriate executive
prerogative, yet, as said by Mitchell, J., in Hovey v. State, 119 Ind. 401, 'It
is a fundamental error to assume that the exclusive right to exercise the
power of appointment is included in the general grant of power to the execuI Terre Haute v,1vansviUe, etc,. R. C. 149 Ind. 174,46 N. A. Rep. 77.37 L. R. A. 189.
2 Overabhner .State, 156 Ind. 187. 59 N.E . 468, 51L.R. A. 748.
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tive.' In the distribution of governmental power the people had the undoubted
right to lodge any part of it where itpleased them, and when expressly placcd
the court will suffer no encroachment upon it by those acting in another department; but where the constitution is silent and the question is one of public
policy, or relates to the best means or agency for the attainment of some
governmental end, it must be presumed that the framers of the constitution
intended to invest the legislative body with a large discretion in the selection
of the agencies most suitable and beneficial to the public."
"Por many years state officers, or officers performing state functions, have
been chosen by private corporations under legislative authority, without
question."

The effect of these holdings of the Indiana court, if they are
capable of being reconciled, may, perhaps, be summarized as follows: (1) Permanent local appointments cannot be made by the
legislature. (2) The legislaturehas no general appointingpower, and,
in general, the power to appoint inheres in the executive. (3) Practical construction has given the legislature the power to appoint
officers of state institutions. (4) Administrative state officers must
be elected.
(5) The power to appoint inferior administrative
officers may be conferred upon superior administrative officers
other than the governor.
(6) Where the legislature has power
to direct the manner of making appointments, it way direct that
they shall be made by a board consisting of the governor and other
state officers; or even by a private corporation.
Kentucky also has recently had an interesting experience with
this question. Under a constitution containing the usual distribution of powers and an express prohibition against the exercise by one
department of powers belonging to another, the legislature passed
an act providing for a board of commissioners of the penitentiary to
be elected by the legislature. There had previously been a number
of cases in that state in which it had been said that the power to
appoint to office is intrinsically an executive function,' and the validity of this legislation was attacked in 1898 in the case of Sinking
Fund Commissioners v. George.2 The court, however, referring
to two other instances in which the legislature had elected officers,
held that "the election of the commissioners was not essentially an
executive function, and that the legislature had the right to elect
them."
This conclusion did not long remain unchallenged. In 1898, the
I See Taylor v. commonwealth, 33.3. Marsh,401: Justices v. Harcourt. 4 B. Mon.
Gorham v. Luckett, 6 B. Mon. 159; Applegate v. Applegate, 4 Metc. 237.
2104 Ky. 260, 47S. W. Rep. 779.
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legislature passed an act creating a state board of election commissioners, to be elected by the legislature. In Prattv.Breckinridgei
an election contest resulting from a decision of this board, the
validity of the act 'creating it was assailed for various reasons, and
among these for the reason that the election of the board by the
legislature involved an encroachment upon executive power. A
majority of the court sustained this contention, citing and relying
upon the Indiana cases already reviewed. It could not be contended, said the court, that the board was a mere legislative agency,
and thus within the conceded power of the legislature to appoint
such inferior officers as are necessary to enable it to execute its
appropriate functions. The election could only be sustained upon
the ground that the legislature had general power to appoint or elect
state officers to fill offices created by it. This contention can not be
sustained:"The creation of an office is accomplished by the exercise of legislative
power. It is done by the enactment of a law. The filling of it, when not
exercised by the people, or in some manner directed or permitted by the
constitution, is executive, and must be performed by an executive officer.
. The legislature has no more power to elect or appoint such officers.
than it has to enact a law providing the judgment to be entered in a pending
litigation."

Three judges dissented, deeming the question settled by the previous decision in Sinking lund Commissionersv. George, 2 -a decision "inaccord with the great weight of authority and the settled
practice in this state long recognized by this court." A vigorous
3
application for rehearing was subsequently denied.
Passing now to the cases in states other -than Indiana and kentucky, one of the earliest is that of Mayor of Baltimore v. Stale,'
whic involved the right of the legislature to appoint police commissioners for the city of Baltimore. It was urged that the clause
in the constitution making the usual division of powers operated to,

prevent the legislature -from exercising such an executiv6 power as
the appointment to office.

But the court replied:-

"We are not prepared to admit that the power of appointment to office is
a function intrinsically executive, in the sense in which we understand the
position to have been taken; namely, that it is inherent in, and necessarily
1 (1901) -

Ky. -.

65 S. W. Rep. 136.

1 104 Ky. 260. sujra.
0 Prattv. nreckfnridge. 66 S.W. Rep. 405.
4 15 Md. 376. 74 Am. Dec. 572 (1860).
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belongs to, the executive department. Under some forms of government, it
may be so regarded, but the reason does not apply to our system of checks
and balances in the distribution of powers, where the people are the source
and fountain of government, exerting their will after the manner, and by
instrumentalities specially provided in the constitution."

It appeared however, that the constitution provided that the gov.ernor should have the appointment of all officers "unless a different
ilode of appointment be prescribed by the law creating the office;"
and the court held that this provision would authorize the legislature to direct that the appointment should be made by itself.
Importance was also attached to the long practical construction
which had been put upon the constitution in this respect from the
time of the organization of the state.
In California the question has been several times before the court.

In the most recent case, Peopk v. Freeman,1 the point was whether
the legislature might elect the trustees having control of the state
library.
The constitution contained the usual clause distributing
powers, and also declared that all officers not therein provided for
should be elected or appointed as the legislature might direct. The
contention here, as in the other cases, was that appointment was

an executive act and could not therefore be exercised by the legislature. It appeared that the power of the legislature to appoint had been

recognized and upheld under a previous and similar constitution,
and had been often exercised.

After discussing some of the cases

holding the function to be executive, and quoting the opinion of

Thomas Jefferson already referred to, the court said:"No doubt these views as to the intrinsic nature of the power of appointment or of nomination to office, and the expediency of confining it to the
executive department of the government, are entitled to the highest consideration, but the question here is, not what the constitution ought to be, but what
itis, or in other words, what was the intention of its framers as to this particular matter. Of course, if there had been at the time of its adoption a
general consensus of opinion in harmony with the views of Mr. Jefferson, as
above quoted, we should be forced to conclude that its framers intended to
forbid to the legislature the exercise of the power of appointment to office.
But there is no such consensus of opinion. On the contrary, it had not only
been decided in other states of the Union, under constitutions containing provisions substantially equivalent to the sections above quoted from our own,
that the legislature could fill offices by itself created, but our own supreme
court, construing identical provisions of our old constitution, had come to the
same conclusion: People v. Langdon, 8 Cal. 16. In view of this construction, so long acquiesced in and acted upon, it must be held that the conven1 80 cal. 233, 22 Pac. Rep. 173.13 Am. St. Rep. 122.
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tion of 1879, in re-adopting the provisions so construed, in the identical terms
of the oldconstitution, intended thatthey should have the sameoperation and
effect formerly attributed to them. If they had meant to prescribe a different
rule, it would have been easy to express such intention in language not to be
misunderstood, and leaving nothing to construction.
"Upon these considerations we feel constrained to hold that the power of
appointment to office, so far as it is not regulated by express provisions of the
constitution, may be regulated by law, and if the law so prescribes, may be
exercised by the members of the legislature."
In Oregon, also, it has been held 1 that the power of appointment is not necessarily an executive function and that the legislatire may therefore properly confer upon the judges of the circuit
court the power to appoint officers having no connection with its

judicial duties, such as the members of a bridge commission; and
that the legislature itself may appoint such officers as railroad commissioners. 2
So,-in Illinois, it has been held that the powerto appoint to office
is alolilicalfunction, not necessarily included in any one of the
three branches of government as recognized by the constitution, and
therefore that the power to appoint such municipal officers as a board
of park commissioners may lawfully be conferred upon the judi8
ciary.
In Iowa, on the other hand, the court in a recent case 4 held
that the power to appoint officers in no way connected with the
exercise of judicial functions could not be conferred upon the judicial department under a constitution making the usual distribution
of powers, and containing the usual prohibition of the exercise by
one department of powers belonging to another. The court said:"Generally speaking appointment to an office is an executive function.
True, not every appointment is executive in character, for appointments may
be made by judicial officers in the discharge of their official duties, and the
legislature may appoint the officers necessary to enable it to discharge its
duties. But such appointments are necessary to enable them to properly discharge their duties, and to maintain their separate existence. These do not
involve an encroachment on the function of any other branch. The appointments authorized by the act in question are in no manner connected with the
I State v. George. 22 Oreg. 142, 29 Pac. 356,16 L. R. A. 737. 29 Am. St. Rep. 556; State v.

Compson, 34 Oreg. 25, 54 Pac. Rep. 349.
2 Bigs v. McBride. 17 Oreg. 640, 21 Pac. 878, 5 L.. I. A. 115.
s People v. Morgan, 90 Il. 558.

This case contains a very full
4 Statev. Barker (1902), - Iowa-. 89 N. W. Rep. 204.
citation of the authorities bearing upon the delegation of powers and duties to judicial

officers.
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discharge of judicial duties, and to our minds clearly fall within the prohibition of the article of the constitution hitherto quoted."
In North Dakota views more nearly resembling those prevailing
in California, Oregon and Illinois have been expressed. Thus in
State v. Boucher,1 the court said:"A careful study of all authorities to which we have been cited and al that
we are able to find, has made it entirely clear to each member of this court
that the power of appointment to office does not necessarily and in all cases
inhere in the executive department, and that when, as in this state, the
express provisions of the constitution vest in the governor a limited power of
appointment, such grant is exclusive, and no other or greater appointing
power canbe exercised. It is different with the legislative department. It is
conceded in the brief of counsel that, by the great weight of authority, constitutional provisions are in the nature of grants of power to the executive and
judiciary, but are limitations upon the power of the legislature. This is no
doubt true. All governmental power not by the constitution lodged elsewhere
resides in the legislature."

In Alabama also the matter has lately been exhaustively considered. 2
A single paragraph will show the conclusion of the court:"Wisdom has dictated that particular offices be filled exclusively by
appointment of some governmental agency other than the vote of the people
themselves, and this, andthe agencies for such appointments, and the methods
of filling vacancies in offices elective by the people, have been expressly manifested and prescribed in our constitutions or laws. Itwas necessary that they
be so prescribed, for otherwise the right of such appointment resided nowhere;
it belonged to no department of the government. With us, the governor has
no prerogatives. He must find warrant in the written law for his every official act. He has nomore power to appoint officers, when not expressly conferred, than has the president of the senate, who is of the legislative, or the
chief justice of this court, who is of the judicial department; and when we go
back to our constitution and laws in this state, from the beginning of the
state government to the present, we find it has been the policy to distribute
this appointing power among the several departments of the state. We need
not specify. The instances will readily occur to the minds of thos familiar
with the constitution and the laws. It may be true that the governor has
been invested with the greatest share of this power, but no principle or policy
has been declared that the power inherently belongs to him. And we may
remark that the fact that all our constitutions, in assigning appointive power
to the governor, have specifically designated the particular officers to whom it
applied, furnishes cogent argument that the people did not regard the power
as necessarily or inherently belonging to him."
In

California and New York the courts have gone still further

1 3 N. Dak. 389. 56 N. W. 142. 21L.R. A. 539.
2 Fox v. McDonald. 101 Ala. 51. 13 South. 416.21 1. R. A. 529.46 Am. St. Rep. 98.
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and held that the power to appoint certain classes of officers, such
as a board of fire commissioners, or commissioners of pilots, may
be conferred upon such non-official associations as the board of
fire underwriters 1 or the chamber of commerce and the presidents
and vice-presidents of marine insurance companies. 2 That some
of the members of the appointing board were not even citizens was
held in the California case to be immaterial.
In North Carolina where the constitution expressly authorizes
the legislature to appoint certain officers, it is held to be clear that
the power to appoint cannot be regarded as exclusively executive. 3
The question of the location of the appointing power has but
recently been decided in Michigan, though there had previously
been several expressions of judicial opinion upon it. In People v.
H-urlbut,4 heretofore referred to, the legislature had passed an act
establishinga board of public works for the city of Detroit, and had
named the first members of the board in the act itself. The case,
as will be recalled, was decided upon the ground that the act violated the right of local self-government, and was therefore void;
but the objection was raised in argument that the legislature had
not the power to appoint to office, and three of the judges expressed
opinions upon it.
Judge Christiancy discussed the question with most fullness.
He said:"This view of the nature of legislative power, as urged by the counsel for
the respondents, struck me at first with considerable force; but reflection and
further examination have satisfied me that, though true as to the great mass
of legislative power-that which is most broadly distinguished from both
judicial and executive-yet it does not include the whole field of what is generally recognized as legislative power, not only in Zngland, but in most of
the statesof the union. Besides the power to make general rules for the government of officers and persons and regulating the rights of classes of persons, or of
the whole community, there is a large class of powers recognized as legislative, occupying an intermediate space between those general rules and regulations, and those of a judicial character on the one side, and executive on the
other, and which are not, and cannot be, marked off from thege by any clear
and palpable line. . . . And as the legislature representsthe public interest,
and has full control of all municipal organizations, as instrumentalities of
government, I see no reason to doubt their power of creating such offices as
they may think the public interest requires, or of filling them with such per2 In re Bulger, 45 Cal. 553.
s Sturgs v. Spofford. 45 N. Y. 446. See also People v. Woodruff. 32 N. Y. 355.
S Cunningham v. Sprinkler, 124 N. C. 638. 33 S. U. Rep. 138.
4 24 Mich. 44. 9 Am. Rep. 103.

THE POWER TO APPOINT TO OFFICE
sons as they choose to designate in the act, except as that power is restrained
by some provision of the constitution. This course of legislation may not be
wise or politic; but as a question of power, I think the legislature possesses
it, with the limitations above mentioned .
..
"As to this mode of appointment being the exercise of a power essentially
executive in its nature, it is sufficient to say that executive power cannot
always be defined by any fixed standard in the abstract. What would come
within the executive power in our form of government, would fall within the
iegislative in another, and vice versa. The question here is, whether, under.
our constitution, it is executive or legislative; and as the constitution has not
confided the appointment of these or the like officers to the executive authorities, and has left itto the legislative discretion whether to create such offices,
and how they shall be filled, it cannot be truly said that such an appointment
is any more in the nature of the exercise of an executive than of a legislative
power."
Judge Campbell, after holding that 9 14 of Art. XV. of the constitution referred only to municipal officers, said:"If there is any restriction on the power of the legislature over officers not
municipal it must be found elsewhere. And, there being no express provision
on the subject, any such limitation must be foubd in some manifest implication. The only one which has been thought of, is that which rests in a supposed distinction between the legislative and executive powers concerning
appointments to public trusts. These powers have been kept separate with
some jealousy, and for very good reasons. The courts are bound to prevent
encroachments by one upon the other, when they are evident. But the line
is not so clearly drawn as to be free from doubt, and so far as practical construction goes under the old constitution, it must have wdight in construing
the present one. The language of both instruments concerning the distinction
of powers is substantially identical. While, under the old constitution
appointments to office were generally by the executive, there are many
instances of state boards and agencies named, in the first instance, by the
legislature where the governor had no voice in the first seleciion beyond hit
part in approving the statute making the appointments. The practice is not
in harmony with the general theory of the constitution, and if the governor
should object to the persons named, I am not prepared to hold that his
objections could be overruled by a two-thirds vote, as they might be if
directed against the body of the statute. When such a case arises, I think
the point worthy of consideration."

Precisely what Judge Campbell meant by this is not very clear,
and the logical conclusion from his language would seem to be that
appointments could not be made without the governor's consent.

Judge Cooley contented himself with saying:"Nor do I think the appointment of the first members of theboard of public works is necessarily void as an exercise of executive authority. There is
no such thing as drawing between legislative and executive power such a clear
line of distinction as separates legislative fromjudicial; and the legislature, in
prescribing new rules, have necessarily a large discretion as to whether the
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agencies for putting them in force shall be named by themselves or left to the
selection of the executive."
But in a note to his treatise on Constitutional Limitations, in commenting upon the claim that appointment to office is intrinsically an
executive act, he had said:
"In a certain sense, this is doubtless so, but it would not follow that the
legislature could exercise no appointing power, or could confer none on others
than the chief executive of the state. Where the constitution contains no
negative words to limit the legislative authority in this regard, the legislature,
in enacting a law, must decide for itself what are the suitable, convenient or
necessary agencies for its execution, and the authority of the executive must
be limited to taking care that the law is executed by such agencies."
In the late case of Attortey General v. Bolger,1 however, the
question arose whether the power to appoint municipal officers could
be conferred upon the municipal legislature and the court, approving the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Christiancy in Peoilev. Hurlbut, held that the power to appoint municipal officers was not so
inherently executive in its nature that it could not be confided to
the common council. The court said:"The constitution does not provide, either directly or indirectly, the manner in which city and village officers shall be appointed. It follows that the
right to appoint them is not inherent in the executive or any other branch of
the city government. That question is left to the discretion of the legislature
to determine which branch of the local government shall exercise the power
of appointment."
No one can investigate this question without being strongly
impressed with the conviction that the weight of opinion both
among statesmen and judges is that the power of appointing to public office, as a matter of public policy, ought not to be regarded as a
legislative function. And in Ohio, the constitution has expressly
forbidden its exercise. No one, however, can escape the conclusion that, by the weight of judicial opinion at the present time, outside of Indiana and Kentucky certainly, if not by the majority of the
decided cases, it is not exclusively or necessarily an executive
function; that, where the constitution is otherwise silent, the
usual division of powers is not conclusive of the matter; and that
the legislature may not only create offices but may also fill
them
itself, or may commit The power of appointment to such officers or
agencies as it may deem proper to select.
Whether this is to be regarded as an evil, it is not the present
purpose to inquire; that the power exists, as a matter of law, seems
reasonably assured from the authorities which have been reviewed.
FLoYD R. Mucn
I Attorney General v. Bolger, 128Mich. 355.

